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provision, the bottle maker may promise the brewer that it
will not sell bottles at a lower price. Typically, the contract will
specify the scope of the MFN. For example, the bottle maker
may promise not to offer a discount to any other brewer or
the bottle maker may further promise not to discount to
juice and soft drink producers. 
MFNs may vary in a number of respects. An MFN could
be negotiated bilaterally and appear as an explicit contractu-
al provision. This is the likely route by which a bottle maker
would commit to an MFN with one or more brewers.
However, an MFN could also be adopted unilaterally by a
firm, simply by announcing it as a policy that will apply to
all buyers. 
An MFN must specify the period when the price com-
parison takes place. If the bottle maker promises not to give
another brewer a lower price this week, the MFN is essentially
contemporaneous. If the bottle maker instead agrees that if
it cuts the price of bottles any time during the next three
months, it will refund the difference to the brewer, the MFN
is retroactive. 
MFNs can be used in contracts at different levels of dis-
tribution. Most antitrust scrutiny has focused on MFNs that
operate between suppliers and intermediate goods producers,
as in the bottle example above. For example, recent Depart -
ment of Justice cases or investigations scrutinize the rela-
tionships between hospitals and insurers and between cable
companies and television networks. However, MFNs may
also be used by retailers selling to end consumers—perhaps,
for example, automobile dealers, appliance stores, or airlines. 
Efficiency Rationales
While MFNs have been subject to antitrust scrutiny, there can
be efficiency reasons for employing this contractual provision.
The efficiency rationales fall into three major categories:
MFNs that mitigate “hold up” problems, MFNs that coun-
teract incentives to delay in contracting, and MFNs that
reduce transaction costs. An MFN’s efficiency rationales and
its anticompetitive effects are not mutually exclusive. That is,
an MFN undertaken to capture an efficiency could never-
theless harm competition, and an MFN undertaken for an
anticompetitive reason could also achieve an efficiency. 
The “Hold Up” Problem. An important source of effi-
ciencies for vertical contracts derives from the role of such
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MOST FAVORED NATION” (MFN,also termed “most favored customer”) con-tractual provisions have come under scruti-ny in recent years by antitrust authorities inboth the US and the EU. Under an MFN,
one party to a transaction promises to give the other party at
least as favorable contractual terms as it gives any other coun-
terparty. For example, a seller may promise at least one cus-
tomer not to sell to any other customer at a lower price.
These MFN provisions appear in a variety of commercial
agreements. 
MFNs are a type of vertical agreement between suppliers
and buyers. The economics literature on this issue, led by the
“Chicago School,” has documented many efficiency ratio-
nales for vertical arrangements, though substantial subse-
quent work recognizes their anticompetitive potential. In
contrast, the economics literature on MFNs has a different
emphasis: this literature highlights the anticompetitive poten-
tial of MFNs, although some papers document a range of
possible efficiency benefits for such provisions. Our article
distills the economics literature on MFNs to explore both
possibilities. 
Features and Varieties
The MFNs that receive antitrust attention most often involve
commitments by sellers, but they may also involve commit-
ments by buyers. In the most common example, the seller
promises a buyer that that if it sells to some other buyer for
less, it will also extend that lower price to the first buyer.1 We
will illustrate various features of MFNs using a hypothetical
example involving the production of bottled beer.
Suppose a brewer purchases a three-month bottle supply
from a bottle maker. If the parties adopt a contractual MFN
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where. The threat of this hold-up possibility could discour-
age the initial investment by the generating plant. To avoid
this threat, and make the investment possible, the parties
may write a long-term contract for the mine to supply coal
to the generator. But a long-term contract specifying prices
and quantities of coal cannot adjust flexibly to changing
market conditions. To address this difficulty, the mine owner
may agree to meet the generating facility’s coal requirements
at the same price that the coal mine is receiving from its
other buyers. The MFN provision allows the price to adjust
when costs or demand change while limiting the ability of the
mine to take advantage of the generator. In this scenario, the
most favored customer clause operates as a substitute for
including escalation and indexing provisions in the contract,
and allows the contracting parties to pin the transaction price
in the long-term contract to the market price.4
Reduce Delays in Transacting. A related but distinct
rationale for MFNs is to prevent delays in transacting. For
example, suppose a land developer wants to create a project
that can only be completed if a number of small parcel hold-
ers sell their property. Each seller may want to be the last to
make a deal. Once the other parcels are secured, after all, the
developer may be willing to pay the last hold out much more
than market value of the seller’s property in order to ensure
that the project would go forward. Under such circumstances,
every seller has an incentive to hold out to become the last
seller, thus endangering the whole project. An MFN can
solve this hold out problem. If the developer promises initial
sellers to pay the difference between the price they received
and the price later sellers receive, that contractual provision
could eliminate the incentive to delay and, perhaps, allow a
project to go forward when it otherwise would not, generat-
ing an efficiency. 
An MFN may also be used to reduce transaction delays in
other settings. In some markets, for example, customers have
an incentive to delay buying because they expect the price of
a good to fall over time. This can occur at the introduction
of a new product, such as a new electronic gadget. It can also
occur if consumers delay purchasing because they suspect that
the seller will end up with unsold inventory that it will dis-
count. For this reason, consumers sometimes wait to purchase
a seasonal fashion item in the hope that it will go on sale as
the season progresses. Similarly, consumers may decline to
purchase theater tickets in advance, with the hope of buying
an unsold ticket at the last minute through discount outlets
such as TKTS.5
In these settings, a seller can introduce an MFN to dis-
courage buyers from delaying and waiting for a better deal.
For example, a theater producer could promise a partial
refund to advance ticket holders if the show does not sell well
and it offers last minute discount tickets. The existence of the
MFN may also signal to the consumer that the theater owner
expects strong ticket demand—in which case a buyer that
waits for a discount seat may miss the show entirely, and
would do better by purchasing undiscounted tickets in
agreements in controlling “hold up” problems. When one
firm makes substantial investments specific to trading with a
given counterparty, the counterparty may try to “hold up”
the investing party by worsening the terms of trade. For
example, consider again the brewer and bottle maker.
Suppose that the bottle maker has invented a distinctive and
convenient new specification of bottle. Adoption of a specific
type of bottle provided by a particular seller may require
investments by the brewer. Specifically, the brewer may need
to retrofit or replace its filling infrastructure to handle the
new bottles. Further, the brewer may need to make invest-
ments in training employees to handle the bottle, and may
possibly make changes in labeling and advertising of the new
bottle type. All of these investments are specific to the rela-
tionship and would be wasted if the brewer were to later
switch to a different type of bottle. If the brewer were simply
to make these investments without getting any assurances or
a long-term contract from the bottle maker, and if the bot-
tle maker understands that the brewer would be unlikely to
switch the bottle type once the investments had been made,
the brewer could be susceptible to exploitation or “hold up”
by the bottle provider. 
Once the brewer agreed to adopt the new bottle, and
made investments predicated on a continuing relationship
with the bottle maker, it would be costly for the brewer to
change its bottle provider. Then the bottle provider could
take advantage of the brewer by giving a competing brewer
a better deal.2 Recognizing this prospect, the first brewer
may be unwilling to adopt the new bottle in the first place,
notwithstanding the new bottle’s innovative design. More -
over, no other brewer may adopt the new bottle for the same
reason, so the bottle maker may be unable to profit from its
new design. To eliminate this possibility, the bottle manu-
facturer might agree to an MFN in its contract with the first
brewer, promising not to give a competitor a better deal.
Here, the MFN operates similarly to a weaker version of an
exclusive territory or a non-encroachment contract. The sup-
plier (bottle producer) does not agree that it will not supply
a competitor (as would happen with an exclusive territory),
but it agrees that it will not give a competitor better terms.
As may sometimes be the case for exclusive territories, the
goal here is to encourage investments in the relationship;
this efficiency rationale has been examined in the economics
literature investigating exclusive territories.3 In this example,
the MFN is welfare enhancing: it allows the bottle manufac-
turer and the brewer to contract efficiently. Similarly, in other
settings, the MFN could be used by a manufacturer to induce
a retailer to invest in a product’s reputation or provide expen-
sive point of sale services.
A second example is the case of a coal-burning generating
facility constructed at the mouth of a coal mine. Once the
generating facility is built, the owner of the coal mine would
be tempted to raise the price of coal to the generating facili-
ty, recognizing that the generator would bear substantial
transportation costs in attempting to obtain coal from else-
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a costly and difficult task. For this reason, litigation over
whether an MFN has been violated is common, and that pos-
sibility should be considered a cost of entering into an MFN
arrangement.7
A second limit to the transactions cost arguments fore-
shadows our discussion of the anticompetitive consequences
of MFNs. Consider a large customer that insists that it be
guaranteed the “best price” from a supplier. The customer is
trying to benefit from other buyers’ negotiating efforts.
However, if many or most buyers ask for MFNs, the seller
will have little incentive to offer discounts to the few remain-
ing buyers who are trying to negotiate. Further, the buyers
have a diminished incentive to push for discounts because
any cost savings they might eke out will be extended to other
buyers, including the buyers’ competitors. Given that the
other buyers have MFNs, a buyer cannot obtain a cost advan-
tage by negotiating a discount from the seller. 
There are also circumstances where MFNs do not appear
to generate efficiencies, but also do not necessarily generate
the possible harms documented below. For example, MFNs
may be negotiated even though the buyer has almost no
opportunity to monitor and enforce adherence to the MFN.
In this case, it appears that the MFN serves as a “trophy” that
the negotiator uses to certify to his employer that he drove a
hard bargain. Here, the MFN has likely made no competi-
tive difference. 
Harms to Competition
The economics literature identifies four classes of competitive
harms from MFNs. Two are collusive theories: the MFN
may operate as a “facilitating practice” that makes coordina-
tion more likely or more effective, or it may simply dampen
competition among non-coordinating rivals. The third class
is exclusionary: the MFN can be used to discourage compe-
tition from entrants or “maverick” incumbents, and thereby
allow firms to obtain or maintain market power. In the final
class of anticompetitive theories, the MFN harms competi-
tion by increasing the seller’s bargaining power.
Facilitating Coordination. The most immediate and
direct significance of an MFN for the seller, and the source
of competitive harms from facilitating coordination and
dampening competition, is to raise the seller’s cost of cutting
advance. In this example, the MFN could benefit consumers
by giving the theater producer the “critical mass” of advance
ticket sales needed to justify mounting the production. But
the MFN in this example also discourages the seller from
reducing price later in the run. Discounting tickets may not
increase sales enough to be worthwhile given the seller’s com-
mitment to provide refunds to early buyers. As a result, prices
would be higher with the MFN than without, and econom-
ic welfare would be lower.6
Reduce Transaction Costs. A frequently cited motiva-
tion for MFNs is to reduce transaction and negotiation costs.
Here, the MFN guarantees that one of the contracting par-
ties will receive the other party’s best price without under-
taking costly negotiations. Suppose, for example, that a start-
up company is launching a new Internet video service. In
order to launch, the startup must contract with numerous
content providers such as record labels. Given the startup’s
uncertain prospects, a small record label may not find it
worthwhile to expend the effort to negotiate a deal with the
startup, a firm that may not even be in existence in a year’s
time. But the small label may be willing to reach a contract
with the startup if it can avoid the costs of bargaining over
price, as it can by entering into an MFN that requires the
small label to sell its content at terms equivalent to those at
which a major record label sells its content to the startup.
This arrangement may allow the startup to assemble a criti-
cal mass of content to launch its service. Absent the MFNs,
the transaction costs of contracting may prevent the startup
from getting off the ground.
Sometimes the beneficiary of lower transaction costs may
be an indirect buyer. For example, consider a pharmacy ben-
efits manager (PBM) that contracts with employers to serve
as a middleman between the employer, pharmacies, and phar-
maceutical companies. The employer may find it difficult to
determine which of the many PBMs it could hire will serve
the employees at lowest cost, given the complexity of phar-
maceutical pricing and the range of drugs that employees
take. If the PBM has an MFN with each major pharmaceu-
tical manufacturer, it may be able to certify to its employer-
customers that it will offer the lowest prices, thereby reduc-
ing the transaction costs arising in PBM negotiations with
employers. 
There are at least two limits to the efficiency gains from
reducing negotiating costs through MFNs. First, while the
MFN lowers the costs in negotiating, the MFN creates other
costs: the costs of monitoring (and potentially litigating)
adherence to the agreement. In the example of the bottle
maker and the brewer, the bottle maker may be tempted to
discount secretly to another brewer in violation of its MFN
commitment if the brewer with the MFN cannot observe the
price the bottle maker charges other brewers. Even if the
brewer also negotiates the right to audit the bottle maker’s
records, brewer-bottler contracts likely contain many terms
other than the per-bottle price. If so, establishing whether or
not a competing brewer received better terms overall may be
The most immediate and direct signif icance of an
MFN for the sel ler, and the source of competit ive
harms from faci l itating coordination and dampening
competit ion, is to raise the sel ler’s cost of cutting
price to buyers other than the buyer that is the 
beneficiar y of the MFN. 
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price to buyers other than the buyer that is the beneficiary of
the MFN. Suppose, to return to the beer bottle example, the
bottle maker agrees in a contract with one brewer that it 
will sell to it at a per-bottle price of $1. Perhaps the bottle-
maker’s incremental production and distribution cost is
$0.80 (and does not vary with its output); if so, the bottle
maker earns a contribution to profit from this contract of
$0.20 per bottle. Suppose further that the bottle maker has
excess capacity, and is approached by a second brewer seek-
ing to buy bottles. Without an MFN, the additional sale
would be profitable for the bottle maker at any price above
$0.80, and it would not be surprising if the bottle maker cut
its price to make additional sales—and thus that the bottle
maker and second brewer would agree on a price of below
what the first brewer paid, such as $0.90 per bottle. 
But suppose the contract between the bottle maker and
the first brewer includes an MFN provision requiring that if
the bottle maker sells to some other brewer for less, it will also
give that lower price to the first brewer. Now if the bottle
maker contemplates selling to a second brewer for $0.90 per
bottle, it must consider an extra cost of cutting price: the
rebate the MFN requires it to give the first brewer. It is easy
to imagine that the contribution to profit the bottle maker
would earn from selling to the second brewer absent the
MFN would be overwhelmed by this additional cost, leading
the bottle maker to decline to sell to the second brewer at any
price below the $1.00 per bottle price paid by the first brew-
er. Put differently, the rebate required by the MFN discour-
ages discounting by effectively “taxing” price-cutting.
To see why a tax on price-cutting facilitates coordination,
suppose that coordinated conduct in this industry is inhib-
ited by suppliers’ incentives to cheat—that is, deterring cheat-
ing is the “cartel problem” the bottle makers have to solve to
make coordination possible or more effective. A bottle maker
that adopts an MFN with some or all customers helps the
industry solve that problem by tying its own hands. The
bottle marker obligates itself to extend any discount it gives
any customer to all customers with which it has an MFN,
thereby raising its own costs of discounting.8 Accordingly, if
the bottle makers that would have the greatest temptation to
cheat introduce MFNs in their contracts with some brewers,
they can solve, or at least reduce, the bottle industry’s prob-
lem of deterring cheating on a coordinated consensus, lead-
ing to higher prices. 
The buyers in this story—the brewers—may be accom-
plices in facilitating coordination,9 for two reasons. First, a
brewer may want an MFN, or at least accept one, even when
MFNs lead all buyers ultimately to pay higher prices. No
brewer wants to be the only one without an MFN.10Without
an MFN, it may reason, it will not pay less for bottles than
any other brewer, and it might end up paying more. Even if
the brewer understands that MFNs may discourage bottler
discounting generally, moreover, that would probably not
be the brewer’s primary concern. Unless the brewer is very
large, most of the harm from higher bottle prices would go
to other brewers, and the individual brewer’s MFN may
make only a small contribution to discouraging bottle maker
cheating generally. 
Second, once some brewers have MFNs with a particular
bottle maker, the other brewers may have less incentive to
drive a hard bargain with that bottle maker, whether it is over
price or over an MFN term.11 After all, a brewer is unlikely
to spend time negotiating price with a bottle maker that is
committed not to discount, or to do so when getting a lower
price would not give the brewer a cost advantage over its
rivals. Moreover, to the extent that buyers actively monitor
their suppliers’ pricing to other customers, they actually help
monitor the bottlers’ anticompetitive agreement, to their
own detriment. 
The presence of MFNs may also facilitate coordinated
conduct through another mechanism: they may help indus-
try participants deter cheating by making cheating easier to
detect. If a bottle maker knows that a rival cannot discount
selectively, but must do so to all the brewers that it sells to,
that practice may make it easier for the first bottle maker to
figure out when its rival is cutting price.
Dampening Competition. The introduction of MFNs
can also lead to higher prices if those provisions lead all the
firms in a market to compete less aggressively.12 We describe
this “dampening competition” theory as a collusive theory
even though it does not depend on the idea relied upon in the
discussion of facilitating coordination that the sellers are in
a repeated interaction and the MFN would help them deter
cheating.13 The dampening competition theory turns instead
on a different conception of coordinated interaction, which
the 2010 Hori zontal Merger Guidelines refer to as “parallel
accommodating conduct.”14
To explain this theory, we again turn to bottle makers
and brewers. As previously discussed, a bottle maker that
includes an MFN in its contracts with brewers is committing
to compete less aggressively. The bottle maker will not com-
pete as hard because it has obligated itself to pay a penalty for
lowering the price to any other brewer. It is less likely to
lower price to any one customer when doing so requires it to
lower price to other customers as well. A bottle maker might
make that commitment if it thinks that rival bottle makers
would respond by also competing less aggressively. The first
firm might think that because it has observed how its rivals
have responded in the past, or because it expects them to
think the same way it does, and, in consequence, adopt
MFNs too. With all the bottle makers competing less aggres-
sively, the result could be higher bottle prices.
A critical part of the story is how the other bottle makers
would react if one bottle maker starts to compete less aggres-
sively. As a matter of economic theory, that reaction could go
either way. If a firm knows that its rival does not want to get
into a price war, maybe it will back off too, and the firms will
reach a comfortable détente in which prices go up; that is
what the “dampening competition” anticompetitive theory
supposes.15 But that is not the only possibility. Perhaps the
Increasing Seller Bargaining Power. Another idea
from the economics literature explains how a durable goods
monopolist can raise price from the competitive level to the
monopoly level by introducing an MFN. To tell the story,
suppose that only one firm sells a durable good like a machine
used in a factory. Buyers expect the product to last many
years. Most buyers do not give up much of the expected ben-
efit by delaying its purchase; perhaps they can use their old
but less good machines for another year. In this setting, the
monopolist may not be able successfully to charge a monop-
oly price.18 The monopolist may be able to make some sales
if it charges a monopoly price, but after it does so, it has a
strong incentive to cut price to attract additional buyers.
Doing so would be profitable even if the additional buyers 
are unwilling to pay the monopoly price, so long as the price
they are willing to pay exceeds the monopolist’s marginal
cost. Patient buyers—who may be most buyers—know that
the monopolist has an incentive to cut price to make addi-
tional sale, so they delay their purchases, waiting for the
monopolist to discount. Indeed, it may be worth it for buy-
ers to delay purchasing even if the monopolist offers them a
price only slightly above the competitive price. With many
buyers delaying their purchases until the price falls, the
monopolist can never profitably charge a price above the
competitive price, not even to early buyers, and always prices
at the competitive level.19
The monopolist can solve this problem if it can find a way
to commit to charging the monopoly price, and avoid the
temptation to discount to capture additional sales. Intro -
ducing an MFN is one way to do that, because it makes it
expensive for the monopolist to discount later.20
One way to understand why buyers stop delaying their
purchases is to interpret their decisions in a bargaining frame-
work. Before the MFN was introduced, each buyer’s best
alternative to purchasing at the monopoly price right away
was to wait until the seller lowered price. Buyers generally saw
that as a good alternative, given them a strong bargaining
position in dealing with the monopolist in the first place. Not
surprisingly, the bargaining outcome favored the buyers.
They could negotiate a competitive price without having to
wait. The seller’s introduction of the MFN made buyer’s
best alternative much less advantageous, reducing the buyer’s
bargaining power substantially. As a result, the seller could
obtain a much more favorable outcome, namely charging the
monopoly price.
A related commitment problem might make it difficult for
a manufacturer with market power to sign up retailers on
other bottle makers will instead take advantage of a less
aggressive rival and try to steal its business, leading bottle
prices to fall.16 Accordingly, in evaluating a dampening com-
petition theory it is necessary to analyze which way the firms
in an industry will respond to the introduction of an MFN.
Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ and Entrants’ Costs.MFNs
may also harm competition by assisting an incumbent in
foreclosing the entry or expansion of rivals. For example,
many health insurance MFN cases have involved claims that
a dominant firm that used an MFN to exclude potential
entrants and constrain fringe rivals. 
To illustrate the use of MFNs for anticompetitive exclu-
sion, suppose that the dominant dental insurer in an area has
signed up most of the region’s dentists. The insurer here is a
buyer, procuring dental services for insured patients from
the dentists. Suppose further that the dominant insurer
includes an MFN clause in its contracts with dentists, allow-
ing the dominant insurer to lower the fee it pays to reimburse
a dentist to equal the lowest fee the dentist charges any other
dental insurance plan. 
The MFN may make it uneconomic for an entrant to
adopt a business model that features selective contracting,
with a limited panel of dentists. The panel dentists would
accept a lower reimbursement rate in exchange for a promise
that the entrant would steer them patients, and the entrant
would pass some of its lower costs through to employers in the
form of lower rates for dental insurance. Had this occurred,
competition from the entrant would have put pressure on the
dominant insurer to lower what it charges employers for den-
tal insurance. In this way, the MFN would insulate the dom-
inant dental insurer from competition and protect its high
rates from erosion. If the dominant insurer instead employs
an “MFN plus” provision, requiring dentists to give it better
rates than they gave any other insurer, that would make it
even more difficult for rivals to compete, including rivals
that want to adopt the same business model as the dominant
insurer (rather than selective contracting). 
As the dental insurance example suggests, an MFN can
harm competition through exclusion by making it impossible
for a dominant incumbent firm’s rivals, including entrants, 
to bargain with input suppliers or distributors for a low price.
When the suppliers or distributors have an MFN with a large
incumbent, they would lose too much if they made that kind
of deal with a small rival or entrant. In this way, the MFN dis-
courages the rivals from lowering their own costs, and so pre-
vents them from competing aggressively.17 Harm to a com-
petitor does not necessarily mean competition is harmed. But
if the MFN prevents suppliers or distributors from giving a
better price to enough of the firm’s significant rivals (includ-
ing prospective ones), it could be used to confer or protect
market power.
There are also other exclusionary possibilities. For exam-
ple, a group of firms could obtain or protect market power
by excluding entry or expansion by a maverick that would
otherwise undermine coordination.
MFNs may also harm competit ion by assisting an
incumbent in foreclosing the entr y or expansion 
of r ivals.  
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terms predicated on the retailer charging a high price to con-
sumers. Once the manufacturer did that, it would be tempt-
ed to sign up competing retailers by giving them a better deal,
such as a lower franchise fee or lower wholesale price, even
though the dealers that sign up later would not charge as high
a retail price. The manufacturer would not care whether the
dealers it signs up later take business from the dealers it pre-
viously contracted with, given that the manufacturer has
already been paid a franchise fee by the earlier dealers. But the
manufacturer would care about getting the additional busi-
ness the later dealers can generate, so it will be willing to sign
them up even it earns a lower franchise fee from the later deal-
ers. In this setting, the manufacturer may have trouble bar-
gaining for advantageous terms with any dealer in the first
place, because each dealer knows that the manufacturer will
be tempted to give it better terms if it signs up later, after the
manufacturer has locked in other dealers. 
The upshot of the story is that the manufacturer has to
give advantageous terms to all the dealers, including a low
wholesale price, in order to sign up any dealers at all. Then
competition among the dealers will keep the price to con-
sumers low, close to the low wholesale price. Thus, the man-
ufacturer may be unable to find a way to ensure that retail-
ers charge consumers higher than competitive price even
though the manufacturer has market power.21 Under such cir-
cumstances, the manufacturer can use an MFN to gain bar-
gaining power when negotiating with the dealers. Then the
manufacturer can set a high wholesale price, allowing it to
dampen retail competition and engineer a high retail price to
exploit its market power in much the way that the durable
goods monopolist can use an MFN to exploit its market
power. 
Conclusion
When a seller commits to give a buyer as good contractual
terms as it gives any other buyer, that commitment can alter
both the seller’s and buyer’s behavior going forward. In some
cases, these changes can improve efficiency, as when they
induce buyers to make relationship-specific investments. In
other cases, however, these changes may be motivated by the
collusive and exclusionary potential of MFNs. 
An important key to understanding the effects of MFNs
is to recognize that contracting parties may ignore the effects
of their contract on firms that are not parties to the contract.
For example, each buyer in an industry individually may
desire, or at least accept, an MFN, even though it harms buy-
ers as a group. Buyers may agree to MFNs that facilitate
coordination or protect incumbent seller market power by
excluding entrants because most of the harm would be borne
by other buyers and no individual buyer can make much dif-
ference in preventing higher prices by declining to accept the
MFN. Hence, even when firms (sellers or buyers) adopt
MFNs for what might appear to be desirable or innocent rea-
sons, the incentives those provisions create could lead to out-
comes that harm competition and consumers. In evaluating
the consequences of MFNs, therefore, one cannot necessar-
ily trust the views of either buyers or sellers about whether the
practice promotes competition. Moreover, the frequency with
which MFNs are employed does not mean that they should
be presumed to promote competition. 
Our survey of the economics literature shows that MFN
provisions can promote competition or harm it. Indeed, they
may do both in any particular industry setting. As we have
shown, to understand their competitive effects, it may be nec-
essary to consider the plausibility of a range of economic
rationales. 
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